Laser Weapons in Space: Policy and Doctrine by Keith B. Payne

Author:Keith B. Payne [Payne, Keith B.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Political Science, Security (National & International), Political Freedom
ISBN: 9780865319370
Google: 1PVTAAAAMAAJ
Goodreads: 3896279
Publisher: Westview Press
Published: 1982-12-01T00:00:00+00:00

b) Deployment of an expanded ground-based ABM

In the face of a BMD challenge to the effectiveness of the U.S.S.R.'s strategic offensive forces, the Soviet Union could respond with a vigorous ballistic missile defense program of its own. Such a program would not by itself constitute a restoration of the strategic status quo ante, because it would do nothing to enhance the penetrability of Soviet missiles. At present, the U.S.S.R.'s powerful ICBM and SLBM forces appear to have two wartime missions — one offensive, the other defensive. Offensively, Soviet missile forces would be used to obtain "the complete rout of the enemy's armed forces, the destruction of his economic potential, the disorganization of the system of political and military control, and the capture of enemy territory."12 Ultimately, Soviet counterforce and counterpolitical targeting appears to be directed toward the elimination of the enemy's ability to resist Soviet post-war demands by destroying his military capacity and political cohesion. As Marshal I. Kh. Bagramian has explained, "Massive nuclear strikes by strategic weapons allow the attainment of the political aims [of the war] in a short period of time."13 By rendering Soviet strategic forces vulnerable in flight, U.S. space-based laser BMD could significantly degrade the U.S.S.R.'s capability to achieve the offensive goals of its strategy, and the development of a comparable Soviet BMD capability would do nothing to restore this lost potential.

There is, however, an important defensive role for Soviet missile forces. By destroying U.S. forces before launch, the U.S.S.R. can hope to limit damage to its own homeland, thereby enhancing its potential for war survival and post-war recovery. Lieutenant General I. Zavialov noted this aspect of Soviet strategy in 1970. "Nuclear weapons," he said, "have increasingly confirmed the role of attack as the decisive form of military action and have given rise to the necessity of resolving even defensive tasks by active offensive actions."14 An effective U.S. ballistic missile defense would undermine Soviet damage- limitation efforts by protecting U.S. retaliatory forces. But a comparable Soviet BMD capability could compensate for the loss of a damage-limiting role for Soviet missiles by protecting Soviet assets even after U.S. missiles are launched.

This in itself might well provide sufficient argument within the Soviet General Staff and Politburo for matching a U.S. deployment of BMD with an enhanced BMD system of their own. The peacetime political benefit of showing oneself capable of meeting any U.S. challenge would further enhance the system's attractiveness. The Soviets have expressed the need to prove that they are the technological equals (or superiors) of the United States in weapons development. Soviet writings point with pride to their achievements in the field of nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles, claiming to be the first nation to develop a deliverable hydrogen bomb and pointing to their early achievements in the development of ballistic missiles.15 With regard to the possible deployment of the enhanced radiation warhead in Europe, Brezhnev reiterated his determination to develop an adequate response:

The Soviet Union is resolutely opposed to the creation of the neutron bomb.

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